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 In assessing Mr Trichet’s tenure it is important to judge both the performance of the 
ECB and the effect of his tenure on the institution’s legitimacy. The ECB’s legitimacy 
affects the future effectiveness of the institution as well as the standing of other EU 
governance institutions. 
 The ECB performed well in targeting price stability prior to August 2007 and Mr 
Trichet did a thorough job of explaining the reasons behind the ECB’s policy 
decisions. His notorious opacity about the decision-making process, however, has 
probably damaged the ECB’s input legitimacy.
 The Governing Council of the ECB’s response to the liquidity crisis was at least as 
good as that of other central banks, but the ECB appears to have been somewhat 
unprepared for its role of lender of last resort and market maker of last resort. Mr
Trichet’s expertise and interest is clearly in the area of monetary policy, not in the 
area of financial markets. It is a design flaw of most central banks that the same 
person is in charge of both monetary policy and financial stability matters when each 
of these activities requires its own expertise and is a full time job.
 The ECB’s opacity about collateral policies is potentially much more damaging than 
the lack of transparency in monetary policy. In deciding what securities to accept as 
collateral and how to value and haircut them the Eurosystem is redistributing 
income and wealth.
 In its attempt to maintain financial stability the ECB and Eurosystem have had to 
walk a fine line between providing just enough liquidity to keep potentially solvent 
institutions afloat and subsidising the financial sector. Occasionally Mr Trichet has
strayed into the latter territory.
 Unfortunately, Mr Trichet’s policy of allowing the markets to properly price sovereign 
debt was not a success. That ECB policymakers did not speak out about the state of 
Greek finances or impose an additional haircut on Greek sovereign debt must have 
suggested to the market that there were two possibilities. Either the ECB had 
superior information that suggested Greece was unlikely to be insolvent or it knew 
that euro area policy makers (or the ECB itself) would bail out Greece – or at least 
its bondholders and other creditors – if Greece were to become insolvent.
 The Securities Market Programme has made the ECB’s continued insistence on 
secrecy particularly damaging. One does not have to be a conspiracy theorist to 
imagine that it is possible that the euro area taxpayers are being called upon to 
subsidise German and French banks after their own governments and government 
agencies failed to exercise proper regulation and supervision.
 The incoming president Mario Draghi faces a difficult task. If he too intends to scorn 
accountability, then he must come up with an output performance that is as about 
as good as that of Mr Trichet. On the other hand if he wishes to be more 
accountable than his predecessor, then he must either somehow square this desire 
with the design flaws of the ECB or facilitate institutional change, some of which 
would require a change in the Treaty.
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1. INTRODUCTION: CHANGING OF THE GUARD
On 31 October 2011, after eight years in office, Mr Jean-Claude Trichet’s term as President 
of the ECB will come to an end. The aim of this note is to evaluate the presidency of Mr 
Trichet and to discuss the challenges that his successor will face. 
An obvious way to assess Mr Trichet’s tenure is to ask the question: how did the 
performance of the ECB (and also that of the Eurosystem) while he was in office affect the 
economies of the euro area and the EU during his term in office? However, it is also 
important to ask how the ECB’s standing as an institution – that is, its legitimacy – was 
affected by the Trichet presidency. The ECB is in its infancy and Mr Trichet will have been 
president for well over half of its existence. Did the practices instituted or perpetuated by 
him increase or decrease its legitimacy? The legitimacy accumulated or lost during Mr 
Trichet’s term in office will affect the future effectiveness of the ECB in the pursuit of its 
objectives.  The legitimacy of the ECB matters also because a lack of legitimacy of one key 
EU governance institution weakens the legitimacy of all other institutions of governance in 
the EU, including the European Commission, the European Court of Justice and the 
European Parliament.
Legitimacy has two components: output legitimacy and input legitimacy. The ECB can 
attain output legitimacy if it achieves success in the pursuit of its assigned objectives of 
price stability and financial stability and if it does not undertake tasks that it has not been 
assigned, even if it can do these tasks well. Apart from its roots in the Treaty, the ECB’s 
input legitimacy depends on the degree to which it is accountable. As the ECB’s 
extraordinary degree of independence means that it is difficult to punish its policymakers 
for bad behaviour, the ECB’s accountability depends on the degree to which the public can 
observe or is provided with the relevant information about its actions and decision-making 
processes and on how good a job the ECB does at explaining and justifying its actions.
I will argue that in terms of output – the effect on the economy – Mr Trichet’s presidency 
has been relatively successful and this must be due in some part to his obvious intellect 
and energy. Up until August 2007 inflation was low and stable and the ECB’s response to 
the financial crisis has been at least as good as that of other central banks. Aside from its 
direct benefit, this has increased the output legitimacy of the ECB. However, Mr Trichet’s 
notorious opacity (something his predecessor Wim Duisenberg shared) has done little to 
enhance this institution’s accountability and input legitimacy. In his defence, it may be that 
Mr Trichet’s lack of transparency has not been entirely due to disdain but to some extent 
may rather have resulted from being handed a poorly designed institution.
The incoming president Mario Draghi faces a difficult task. If he too intends to scorn 
accountability, then he must come up with an output performance that is as about as good 
as that of Mr Trichet – and this would be no mean feat. If he fails, something that could 
happen due to shear bad luck, this could threaten the institution’s legitimacy and possibly 
even its survival. On the other hand if he wishes to be more accountable than his 
predecessor, then he must either somehow square this desire with the design flaws of the 
ECB or facilitate institutional change, some of which would require a change in the Treaty.
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2. PRESIDENT TRICHET AS AN INFLATION TARGETER 
BEFORE THE CRISIS
In evaluating the performance of the ECB and Eurosystem under the Trichet presidency, it 
is useful to split Mr Trichet’s term in office into two parts. Up until the onset of the liquidity 
crisis in August 2007, conditions were benign and the primary task of the ECB was to 
provide low and stable inflation. Since August 2007, the primary focus of the ECB has been 
to contain the liquidity crisis and the financial crisis into which it evolved and, within its 
powers as a central bank, to mitigate the credit, banking sector insolvency and sovereign 
debt crises. In this section I consider how the ECB did prior to August 2007 under the 
tenure of Jean-Claude Trichet. I consider the inflation-targeting performance of the central 
bank and the degree to which the new institution was seen as accountable.
2.1. Did the Trichet Presidency Result in Low and Stable Inflation?
How good a job has the ECB done in targeting inflation? An obvious and simple way to 
judge this in this relatively calm period is to consider how near observed inflation has been 
to the ECB’s target inflation of below but close to two percent in the medium term.1 Figure 
1 below depicts monthly annual percentage changes in the euro area inflation rate under 
both the Duisenberg and Trichet presidencies. 
Figure 1. Inflation rate (HICP), Annual Percentage Changes
Sources: ECB, UK Office of National Statistics
Given the long and variable lags between the implementation of monetary policy and when 
the policy is fully transmitted to inflation, the data in the chart begin in January 2000. Mr 
Trichet took office in November 2003 and cannot be entirely responsible for inflation prior 
to about November 2005. However, as seen in the chart, the inflation targeting 
performance was remarkably similar for both Mr Trichet’s presidency and his predecessor’s.
As seen in Figure 1, up until the beginning of the liquidity crisis in August 2007, the ECB did 
a good job of producing stable, if slightly above target, inflation. Average inflation was 2.2 
percent with a standard deviation of 0.3. In comparison, the Bank of England produced 
significantly lower, but much more volatile inflation, with an average of 1.6 percent and a 
standard deviation of 0.6. 
                                               
1 Or, less than two percent prior to May 2003.
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In addition to the ECB performing well in providing price stability prior to August 2007, Mr 
Trichet did a thorough job of informing the press, policy makers and the public about the 
reasons behind the ECB’s policy decisions. Each monthly rate decision was accompanied by 
a detailed explanation for the actions and a press conference. During Mr Trichet’s time in 
office members of the Executive Board gave a total of 9.2 speeches per month, with Mr 
Trichet accounting for 3.4 – over a third.2
2.2. Did the Trichet Presidency Enhance the Legitimacy of the 
Central Bank in Monetary Policy Making?
The ECB was set up in a way that would allow individual members of the Governing Council 
to be held accountable. Article 10 of Protocol 4 of the consolidated version of the treaty 
makes it clear that decisions are to be the result of a vote. Indeed, the description of 
exactly how the voting is to work is extraordinarily detailed, with 834 words devoted to the 
topic. During Mr Trichet’s tenure in office the procedure was simple: decisions were to be 
made by a vote and ‘[e]ach member of the Governing Council [was to] have one vote’.
The ECB is not unusual in that its decisions are supposed to be made by majority vote. The 
Bank of Japan, Sweden’s Riksbank, the Bank of England and the US Federal Reserve are all 
expected to operate in this fashion. The way that the ECB and these other central banks 
disclose their deliberations and votes is shown in Table 2, below. 
Table 2: Procedural Transparency
Country Policy Statement Minutes
ECB Decision none
Japan Decision and vote Unattributed discussion, 
named dissenters’ arguments
Sweden Decision and dissenters Attributed discussion
United Kingdom Decision Unattributed discussion and 
vote
United States Decision and vote Unattributed discussion
As can be seen in Table 2, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States all 
publish the votes of their monetary policy committee. Japan, Sweden and the United States 
do it right away; the United Kingdom waits two weeks to publish the vote with the minutes. 
Moreover, these four countries all publish the minutes of their discussion. Japan publishes 
the dissenters’ arguments and the discussion in the Swedish central bank’s minutes is 
attributed. The ECB alone among these five countries does not publish a vote or minutes.3
                                               
2 This includes speeches, interviews and the Quarterly Dialogue.
3 The ECB is not alone in not publishing a vote or minutes. Australia provides only its policy statement after the 
meeting and the consensus view in its minutes two weeks later; Canada and Norway provide only their policy 
statements. The monetary policy committees in these central banks however, do not vote, and are expected to 
reach a decision by consensus.
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Given the lack of information provided by the ECB, it was natural that the press should be 
curious about how its decisions were reached and this has been a popular question at the 
post-meeting press conferences. On 12 April 2003, Mr Trichet assured the press that there 
was a consensus. On 12 February 2004 he announced there was ‘a very, very large 
consensus’. On at least eight further occasions prior to August 2007 he claimed the 
Governing Council was unanimous. When he announced on 3 August 2006 that a decision 
was ‘overwhelmingly supported’, a member of the press eagerly asked if that meant there 
were dissenters. Trichet clarified, that ‘[b]y “overwhelming majority” I meant a fully-
fledged consensus. There were no other views on today’s decision.’ On May 2006 he 
insisted that not only was the decision unanimous, but that the Council had thought as one: 
‘At today’s meeting we were unanimous in our attitude, decision and overall analysis… .’ 
Throughout the period the press repeatedly asked if any other decision than the one taken 
had been considered, only to have Trichet refuse to be engaged. On 5 February 2004 he 
insisted his answers were a ‘demonstration of total transparency’.
When questioned about the ECB’s lack of transparency in its conduct of monetary policy Mr 
Trichet’s stock response has been to view transparency as being equivalent to explaining 
one’s decisions ex post and to extoll the virtue of the ECB in this regard. The following 
response at the 3 June 2004 press conference is typical:
‘First of all, as regards the transparency of the central banks, I have to mention 
again what I have already said quite a lot of times: first, that we are – to my 
knowledge – the first central bank in the world that has introduced a real-time 
display of the diagnosis of the Governing Council, of the monetary policy body. 
We were the first ones. We started the thing. We started the concept. We are 
still the only ones, to my knowledge, who publish a thorough diagnosis of the 
Governing Council in real time. And you will have this diagnosis – I have just 
read it and it will be published. Others publish short communiqués, not four or 
five pages of diagnosis. We probably remain the only ones among comparable 
central banks to have a press conference in order to be as clear as possible and 
as transparent as possible. For a number of reasons we consider that it is not 
opportune, as you know, to display the individual position of members of the 
Governing Council. I will not go on stressing the fact that we are very, very 
transparent.’
The press have not been the only ones to receive this answer. European Parliament ECON 
committee members were similarly brushed off at the 14 September 2005 (page 12) and 
20 February 2006 (pages 14-15) Quarterly Dialogues with the ECB.
Professional economists, even ones that become central bankers, are not especially 
known for thinking alike and abhorring confrontation. So, how is it that – according to 
Mr Trichet – year after year the members of the Governing Council arrived at exactly 
the same conclusion at the end of every meeting? Eventually the answer became clear: 
there was no dissent because votes were never taken. This was made explicit in the 10 
January 2008 press conference when Mr Trichet said, ‘As you know, we do not vote and 
have never voted in the past.’ Apparently, some small subset of the Governing Council 
decides, prior to the meeting, what the decision will be and this is then presented to the 
entire Governing Council as a fait accompli. This arrangement also explains how the 
Governing Council is able to produce the lengthy post-policy meeting statement that Mr 
Trichet views as the ECB’s major contribution to transparency. With the decision made 
before the meeting, there is ample time to prepare it.
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That this extraordinary decision-making mechanism has gone on for so long with no formal 
explanation beggars belief. It also leaves open a number of questions. Exactly who gets to 
make the decision? And, why is it that no Governing Council member has ever insisted 
upon his or her legal right to a vote? That one can ask these questions about an institution 
that is supposed to be one of the world’s two most important central banks is not good for 
the legitimacy of such an institution. Moreover, while admittedly the arrangement  
functioned reasonably well in terms of economic performance  under the leadership of Mr 
Trichet, what would happen if some future president were a little less like the current one 
and a little more like, say, Davíð Oddsson?
Why have both Mr Trichet and his predecessor been willing to be party to such a lack of 
accountability? And why have the European Parliament and its Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs put up with this?  Part of the reason may be that the structure of the ECB 
has meant that its Governing Council would never be able to function efficiently in a 
manner similar to those models of transparency the Bank of England and the Swedish 
Riksbank. Even prior to Slovakia’s entry into the euro area in 2009 the Governing Council 
had 21 members: a ludicrous size for a decision-making body. It now has 23.
With 21 members, if each had gotten a ten-minute opening statement, the rate-setting 
meeting would have gone on for three and a half hours before any actual debate began. 
The optimal size for a monetary policy committee is probably about seven: just enough for 
reasonable collection of different types of expertise and not too big for serious discussion. 
With no formal way of reducing the size of the decision-making body, Mr Trichet and some 
of his colleagues may have opted for making monetary policy informally.
How monetary policy is made is not the only thing that the ECB has always been guarded 
about. At the 13 January 2005 post-policy-meeting press conference a reporter asked, ‘You 
said the bulk of your currency reserves are dollars? How much is that?’ Lucas Papademos, 
the Governing Council member accompanying Mr Trichet responded, ‘The composition of 
our foreign reserves we do not disclose.’ 
As of 2006, 23 countries demonstrate their commitment to transparency by disclosing the 
currency composition of their foreign reserves. Of the world’s top 25 holders of foreign 
exchange reserves, seven disclose their composition. Of those who do not, all but four at 
least adhere to the Special Data Dissemination Standard set up following the Mexican Crisis 
of 1994-1995 and, as part of that, disclose the amount of reserves denominated in SDR 
currencies in aggregate at least once per year. The four who refuse to adhere are China, 
Libya, Algeria and that bastion of secrecy, the ECB.4
                                               
4 See Truman, Edwin and Anna Wong, ‘The Case for an International Reserve Diversification Standard,’ Institute 
for International Economics Working Paper, May 2006.
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3. THE TRICHET PRESIDENCY AND FINANCIAL STABILITY
In this section I consider how well the ECB did in handling the liquidity and solvency crises 
and the sovereign debt crisis. I consider the effect on the ECB’s legitimacy.
3.1. How did the Trichet Presidency Handle the Liquidity and 
Solvency Crises?
By early August 2007 the market for asset-backed securities had become dysfunctional. 
On 9 August BNP Paribas froze three of its investment funds after what it called the ‘the 
complete evaporation of liquidity in US credit markets.’ Overnight interest rates rose 
sharply. To the surprise of the markets, the Governing Council of the ECB swung into 
action, dousing the market with liquidity amounting to EUR 94.84 billion, followed by a 
further EUR 61.05 billion the next day.5
The initial reaction of the Governing Council to the liquidity crisis of August 2007 was to 
focus on the rise in interest rates: the benchmark overnight interbank interest rate had 
risen well above the four percent minimum bid rate in the Eurosystem’s main refinancing 
operations. However, the real problem was not that financial institutions could not borrow 
at a reasonable interest rate using the good-quality collateral demanded by the 
Eurosystem. Instead, it was that they could not sell their asset-backed securities or use 
them as collateral because the markets for these assets had dried up. 
The appropriate response to the situation where some markets become dysfunctional is not 
to offer additional liquidity in return for collateral that is still traded in functioning markets. 
Instead, it is to restore the functioning of the markets that have frozen. For once, however, 
Mr Trichet was lucky in the institutional design of the Eurosystem that he had inherited. 
Since its inception the Eurosystem has been able to accept a wide variety of financial assets 
as collateral, including private securities and asset-backed securities rated A by at least one 
of the major ratings agencies. However, the ECB’s response probably would have been 
more effective if the Governing Council had immediately further expanded the set of types 
of securities that it accepted as collateral. This would, however, have presented a 
significant technical challenge as it would have had to devise some way of pricing these 
assets appropriately as the normal market prices no longer existed, and it would have had 
to additionally impose a haircut to compensate for these assets’ loss of illiquidity. 
As the liquidity crisis continued and widened into a solvency crisis, the ECB’s policies 
evolved. When the spread between the three-month LIBOR and the overnight indexed swap 
rate widened, the ECB responded sensibly by undertaking liquidity-providing longer-term 
refinancing operations with a maturity of three months and offsetting these with their main 
(short-term) refinancing operations. They also conducted US dollar liquidity-providing 
operations using a temporary swap line with the Federal Reserve. In March of the following 
year they ventured into refinancing operations with a maturity of six months.  On 8 October 
2009 the ECB announced that it would provide unlimited liquidity in its weekly main 
refinancing operations at a fixed rate; this was later extended to its longer-term operations 
as well. In May 2009 the ECB announced that it would conduct unlimited liquidity-providing 
operations with a one-year maturity at a fixed rate.6
                                               
5 An unexpected dramatic move by a central bank can reassure the markets that policy makers are taking matters 
seriously or it can cause them to wonder what bad news the central bank knows that they do not.
6 The ECB had hoped to phase these non-standard monetary policies out in 2010 but they remain in place to deal 
with the on-going sovereign debt crisis. 
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It was not until 15 October 2008 that the Governing Council of the ECB made the 
necessary and massive changes in what was to constitute eligible collateral. Marketable 
debt instruments issued in the euro area, but denominated in dollars, pounds and yen, 
were made eligible subject to a uniform additional haircut of eight percent. Euro-
denominated securities issued in the United Kingdom became eligible and, most 
importantly, the credit threshold for marketable and non-marketable assets was 
lowered from A- to BBB-, with the exception of asset-backed securities. An additional 
haircut of five percent was be added to all BBB-securities.
The Governing Council of the ECB’s response to the liquidity crisis was a least as good as 
that of other central banks. But, as was the case with other central banks, the ECB appears 
to have been somewhat unprepared for its role of lender of last resort and market maker of 
last resort. The liquidity crisis of 2007 came as a complete surprise to Mr Trichet and the 
ECB. At the post-policy meeting press conference on 3 August 2006, Mr Trichet was asked, 
‘[D]o you believe that concerns about financial stability or financial imbalances in the euro 
area have increased since the early months of this year?’ He responded with, ‘I will not 
comment on financial stability. I do not see any element that would be significant at this 
stage.’ A year later (2 August 2007) he commented that, ‘We are in an episode where 
prices that were under-assessing an element of risk in a number of markets are 
normalising. I will not give any other qualification to the situation: it is a process of 
normalisation.’
That the ECB was unprepared for the liquidity crisis and somewhat slow to respond is 
perhaps a reflection of its expertise. The freezing of credit markets – probably to a great 
extent due to adverse selection problems associated with asymmetric information – is a 
problem that is not something most macroeconomists and central bankers are especially 
qualified to deal with.  And, not being recent practitioners it seems quite possible that 
many members of the Governing Council could not have explained what a collateralised 
debt obligation was prior to 2007. Jean-Claude Trichet’s expertise and interest is clearly in 
the area of monetary policy, not in the area of financial markets. It is a design flaw of most 
central banks that the same person is in charge of both monetary policy and financial 
stability matters when each of these activities requires its own expertise and is a full time 
job.
3.2. Did the ECB’s Handling of the Liquidity and Solvency Crises 
Enhance its Legitimacy?
When the ECB values marketable securities as collateral, it uses market prices, if they are 
available. If not, it computes theoretical prices. Unfortunately, the public is not informed, 
even with a lag to protect market-sensitive information, what these prices are. Nor will the 
ECB divulge its methodology or models. Without knowing how it computes these prices, 
outside observers cannot evaluate whether the ECB is pricing risk correctly, or instead is 
subsidising or taxing particular counterparties. 
After deciding the value of a security, the ECB imposes a ‘haircut’. Haircuts are not typically 
thought of as a penalty for default risk as this is supposed to be reflected in the security’s 
value. Instead, they might be viewed as a compensation for a loss of liquidity or, perhaps, 
they might also be viewed as compensation for taking on the correlated default risks of the 
ECB’s counterparty and of the issuer of the security offered as collateral by the 
counterparty. If there is a non-trivial risk that a systemically important institution might 
default and if it is not known which potential borrowers from the Eurosystem would be in 
danger of defaulting if that institution defaulted, then it is reasonable to increase the 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policies
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haircut on the debt of the systemically important institution above what it would otherwise 
be. 
Unfortunately, the ECB does not tell us how it computes its haircuts or even what it 
believes a haircut is supposed to be a penalty for. Moreover some of the ECB’s haircut 
policies seem inexplicable: why do haircuts increase rapidly with an asset’s maturity even 
when the potential illiquidity does not necessarily do so? Haircuts that rise sharply with the 
remaining maturity of the collateral also encourage the issuance of short-term debt.  It is 
therefore no surprise that euro area banks are facing massive short-term debt refinancing 
requirements during a period that they are also trying to access the markets for additional 
capital. One is left wondering if the ECB even has a coherent theory of how to determine 
haircuts.
This opacity about collateral policies is potentially much more damaging than the lack of 
transparency in monetary policy. In deciding what securities to accept as collateral and how 
to value and haircut them the Eurosystem is redistributing income and wealth. 
Members of the ECON committee in their Quarterly Dialogue with the ECB have attempted 
to extract information about ECB’s policies regarding collateral from President Trichet. 
However, at the December 2009 Dialogue when a member asked, ‘To increase its 
legitimacy, the ECB should publish the minutes of the Governing Council meetings … And 
should not this transparency also apply to the internal models used to value [il]liquid 
collateral?’ Trichet ignored the question and said, ‘We have transformed the way 
transparency is looked at.’  When another member asked about how asset-backed 
securities are valued, Trichet said, ‘This is done by the system in ways which I considered 
appropriate but that we can improve at any time if we judge that they should be improved 
– as we have demonstrated very recently, because the last improvement dates from only a 
few days ago.’  In other words: I’m not going to tell you and only our opinion matters. As 
long as the Governing Council is seen as competent, this view – which might almost be 
interpreted as verging on arrogance – may be tolerable, but on the chance that someday 
events may cause it to not be seen so, it would be better for the legitimacy of the 
organisation if the president were a little more forthcoming.
In its attempt to maintain financial stability the ECB and Eurosystem have had to walk a 
fine line between providing just enough liquidity to keep potentially solvent institutions 
afloat and subsidising the financial sector. Given the ECB’s lack of transparency it is not 
easy to judge how well they have done at this, but a couple of examples show that they 
occasionally – through design or otherwise – strayed into the quasi-fiscal subsidisation and 
transfers territory. One example is the national central bank of Luxembourg’s policy of 
allowing Icelandic banks to borrow from it using each other’s debt as collateral.  Another is 
the unlimited one-year fixed rate liquidity provision announced on May 2009. In June of 
that year 1121 banks, eager to offer up their BBB- collateral collected EUR 442 billion from 
the Eurosystem. An act of generosity that Willem Buiter estimates may have cost the ECB 
(ex ante) about a billion euros.7  Subsidising banks – Icelandic or otherwise – is not part of 
the ECB’s mandate. Unelected bodies should not play Santa Claus with taxpayer funds and 
these episodes did not enhance the ECB’s legitimacy.
                                               
7 Buiter, Willem, ‘Recapitalising the Banks through Enhanced Credit Support: Quasi-Fiscal Shenanigans in 
Frankfurt, Maverecon, Financial Times, 28 Jun 2009.
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4. THE TRICHET PRESIDENCY AND THE SOVEREIGN DEBT 
CRISIS
Jean-Claude Trichet was initially adamant that the ECB should not meddle in national 
governments’ fiscal policy. In response to a question about whether he was worried about 
downgrades of member states’ debt at the 8 December 2008 Quarterly Dialogue, he stated 
that, ‘our position has always been crystal clear: governments are responsible for their 
fiscal policies’. Nevertheless, the ECB may have played a role in exacerbating the sovereign 
debt crisis and it has been forced to play a role in trying to contain it. In this section I 
consider how the ECB’s collateral policies and the ECB’s Securities Markets Programme 
(SMP) have been used in ways both good and bad to mitigate it.
That an unelected monetary policy maker has been pressured into playing a fiscal role was 
never going to be good for the central bank’s legitimacy. I also consider how the actions of 
Trichet and the Governing Council made things better or worse than they could have been.
4.1. The Sovereign Debt Crisis and Collateral
Despite Mr Trichet’s reluctance to meddle in Member States’ fiscal affairs, there was one 
area where the Governing Council should have been responsible for assessing member 
countries’ fiscal policies and that was in deciding when to accept and how to haircut the 
sovereign debt offered as collateral to the Eurosystem. Initially the policy of the 
Eurosystem was that all members’ sovereign debt was acceptable as collateral as long as it 
was not rated less than A- and it was all treated identically as far as haircuts were 
concerned. As early as 2005, members of the European Parliament pressed Mr Trichet on
the wisdom of this. At the November 2005 Quarterly Dialogue John Purvis asked, ‘No 
member state is anywhere near down to A- and some of them are pretty profligate, so do 
you think the line should be a little bit tougher on what you would accept in the way as 
collateral?’ At the same meeting Pervenche Berès asked about the wisdom of relying on the 
ratings agencies’ judgment, given the debate on the ‘credibility and quality’ of their work. 
Mr Trichet was not to be drawn in and avoided answering either question.
It appeared that, in Mr Trichet’s view, the market would appropriately price sovereign debt 
and that it was inappropriate for the ECB to impose any further penalties. At the December
2005 post-policy press conference he commented:
‘We were told very often by parts of the economists’ community and by a lot of 
good advisors that we were – and this was exactly the contrary observation –
too benign, too positive vis-à-vis government paper, that we should practice a 
lot of haircuts and so forth, or practice haircuts combined with the Stability and 
Growth Pact implementation – or non-implementation. We thought that this was 
not appropriate. We said that it was not appropriate for us to invent a new 
sanction that would apply for non-compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact 
via this collateral mechanism. We felt that we should not do that. But we 
mentioned also very clearly to market people that we were taking the paper at 
its market value, so that if the markets would assess that the paper was less 
credible and the spreads would augment, then the value of the paper that we 
would take as collateral would diminish. And then we were sticking to this 
appreciation by the market itself.’
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Trichet should have not have interpreted haircuts as ‘sanctions’ but as compensations for 
liquidity risk or correlation. Greece is systemically important and even in 2005 had a non-
trivial default risk: the fortunes of the Greek sovereign and the financial institutions offering 
sovereign Greek debt as collateral were linked and the Eurosystem should have been paid a 
premium for this. The Eurosystem should also have exercised some discretion: banks that 
were known to be sufficiently exposed to Greece should not have been allowed to offer 
Greek sovereign debt as collateral at all.
Unfortunately, Mr Trichet’s policy of allowing the markets to properly price sovereign 
debt was not a success. The interest rate differential between 10-year Greek and 
German government bonds was only about half a percent through 2007. By the end of 
2008 it had reached 2.25 and was only 2.41 at the end of 2009. One explanation for 
this is that the market observed the complacency of policy makers and may have been 
perceived them as being better informed. That ECB policymakers did not speak out
about the state of Greek finances, even though they must have realised by 2004 that 
Greece was verging on insolvency, and that they continued to accept Greek sovereign 
debt on the same terms as they accepted German sovereign debt must have 
suggested to the market that there were two possibilities. First, the ECB had superior 
information that suggested Greece was unlikely to be insolvent or, second, the ECB 
knew that euro area policy makers (or the ECB itself) would bail out Greece – or at 
least its bondholders and other creditors – if Greece were to become insolvent.
4.2. The Securities Markets Programme (SMP)
On 9 May 2010 the Governing Council decided, ‘To conduct interventions in the euro area 
public and private debt securities markets (Securities Markets Programme) to ensure depth 
and liquidity in those market segments which are dysfunctional.’ Such a programme could 
and would be used for two purposes. 
The programme was introduced to support the price of Greek government debt and to 
support euro area banks that held this debt. The measure was introduced along with a 
suspension of any minimum threshold rating for Greek sovereign debt, announced on 3 
May.8 While it must have been deeply distasteful for Mr Trichet (and many others as well) 
for the Eurosystem to have to act as a fiscal player taking outright sovereign risk, the hope 
that it would stave off Greek insolvency until it could be handled in a more orderly way in 
2013 when the European Stability Mechanism comes into force and all EU Member States 
ought to have created Special Resolution Regimes for their banks, may have made this a 
less unpalatable option then allowing Greece to default in May 2010. 
The second purpose of such a programme is to prevent markets from becoming 
dysfunctional or to restore the functioning of dysfunctional markets. Asymmetric 
information problems can cause adverse selection problems that shut down a market.
Or, there may be a bad outcome in a scenario where multiple outcomes are possible.  
Investors might refuse to hold an asset in the belief that other investors will refuse to 
hold it, although they would hold it if they thought other investors planned to. 
Undoubtedly there are various behavioural anomalies and pathologies that can also 
cause markets to cease functioning. If such market failures occur, it is reasonable for 
the central bank to intervene.  If fears of contagion cause the market to shun, say, 
Italian sovereign debt, when it would otherwise hold it, then the ECB may be justified in 
purchasing Italian debt in its role of market maker of last resort. As long as the ECB 
                                               
8 The ECB suspended its minimum ratings threshold for Irish sovereign debt on 31 Mar 2011. Perhaps it was 
supposed to be implicit that that they required the Greek and Irish sovereigns not to be in default.
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prices the debt prudently, then the ECB is acting within its capacity as a monetary 
authority.
For the ECB to be able to ensure markets remain functional it must be credible that it will 
purchase as much debt as it takes at the price it deems sensible. The ECB’s purchases of 
small amounts of Portuguese and Irish debt and its refusal to intervene in the markets for 
Spanish and Italian debt clearly did not send the right message on Thursday 4 August 
2011.
The Securities Market Programme has made the ECB’s continued insistence on secrecy 
particularly damaging. A counterparty who can sell, say, Greek government debt to the 
Eurosystem at a price that it could not get in the market is better off than another potential 
counterparty that is not given that opportunity and it gains at the expense of the 
Eurosystem. Because the Eurosystem’s purchase of Greek sovereign debt at prices above 
fair value (which appears to have been the case, as the average discount to face value paid 
for the Greek debt acquired under the SMP is widely believed to have been no more than 
20 percent) amounts to a taxpayer subsidy of the Eurosystem’s select counterparties, the 
ECB must be transparent about how it has chosen and continues to choose its 
counterparties for Securities Market Programme transactions. Once sufficient time has 
passed to ensure that the information is no longer market sensitive, the details of these 
outright purchases should be publicly available. Otherwise, one does not have to be a 
conspiracy theorist to imagine that the euro area taxpayers are being called upon to 
subsidise German and French banks after their own governments and government agencies 
failed to exercise proper regulation and supervision.
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5. THE CHALLENGES FOR THE NEW PRESIDENCY
Incoming ECB president Mario Draghi does not face an enviable situation. The sovereign 
debt crisis is gaining strength, dampening the economic recovery that might have 
otherwise been expected to follow the liquidity and solvency crises. The institution inherited 
by Mr Draghi is not fit for purpose. His predecessor set a relatively high standard for 
competency, but damaged the legitimacy of the organisation.
It is clear that the Eurosystem as monetary policy maker and financial supervisor needs to 
be reformed and this requires a change in the Treaty which is no mean feat. A very thin 
silver lining in the economic black cloud is that it may be that crises facilitate reform. It is 
argued that crises shake up entrenched interest groups, increase the acceptance of the 
need for change and makes groups realise that their political interactions must change.9
The current situation may be conducive to policy change.
The Governing Council of the ECB is a preposterously badly designed monetary policy 
committee. Making monetary policy is primarily a technical task and requires discussion. 
Committees with well over twenty members do not have discussions. The Executive Board 
or the Governing Council might be allowed to choose the precise definition of price stability, 
but it would be better to make the committee that sets the policy rate to attain that target 
a separate and independent entity with about seven members. Perhaps it might have three 
members from the Executive Board and four external members – and preferably not 
Governors of Eurosystem national central banks. Externals reduce the possibility of 
groupthink and lend expertise that senior policymakers do not always have. There is no 
reason to require that the externals be euro area or even EU citizens: for a complex 
technical activity, whether its monetary policy or neurosurgery, it is generally best to get 
the most competent people you can afford. Objections that all countries need a voice 
should be recognised as counter to the spirit Article 7 of Protocol 4 of the Treaty 
(consolidated version) that says governments of the Member States are not to seek to 
influence the members of the decision-making bodies. Monetary policy decisions, other 
than choosing the policy rate, might be delegated to the Executive Board.
The Governing Council of the ECB was also not well designed to deliver financial stability. 
As prior to August 2007 its efforts were primarily focused on monetary policy, it lacked the 
necessary expertise. Moreover, those members of the Executive Board who were actively 
involved in formulating monetary policy and explaining it to the public, press and policy 
makers already had a sizable job. If the monetary policy committee were made separate 
from the Governing Council and Executive Board then some Executive Board positions could 
be filled by micro-economists, financial economists, recent practitioners and experts in 
money and banking.
Monetary policy committees need to be independent so that they are protected from 
politicians who might be tempted to use monetary policy opportunistically. Central banks 
do not have a similar need to be independent. It would not be optimal to have the ECB 
completely subject to legislators – as is the Federal Reserve – but the European 
Parliament’s role as overseer might be enhanced. The Quarterly Dialogue should be 
renamed the Quarterly Testimony.
                                               
9 See, for example, Drazen, Allan, Political Economy in Macroeconomics, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
2000, ch. 10. This hypothesis is difficult to test because of the difficulty in measuring crises and reforms.
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As a protector of financial stability the Eurosystem needs to act as lender and market 
maker of last resort. To be credible it must be willing and able to commit an unlimited 
amount of funds. If it prices assets correctly and haircuts liquidity and correlation risk 
appropriately this involves no ex ante fiscal cost. If  it is credible that the ECB is willing and 
able to do this it may avert many financial crises associated with adverse selection and 
multiple equilibria without ever ‘acting’ in the sense of actually making asset purchases or 
injections of funding liquidity. However, if it must act then there is always the possibility of 
an ex post loss. This suggests that arrangements for recapitalising the Eurosystem should 
be in place.
To protect its legitimacy the ECB must realise that there is an important distinction 
between accountability and providing a post-policy-meeting statement, even if it is five 
pages long. This is true even if the post-policy-meeting statement is not ‘pre-cooked’ the 
way is has been up till now. The monetary policy committee should start taking votes, 
reporting the outcomes and publishing the minutes.10 The Governing Council should publish 
its models for determining haircuts and theoretical prices of illiquid marketable assets.
In addition to improving its accountability, the ECB should resist roles that are not assigned 
to it. While Mr Trichet may have felt that he had no choice other than to purchase Greek 
debt under the Securities Market Programme, it is not the proper function of the 
Eurosystem to redistribute tax payer money. He should only have agreed to do so as a 
fiscal agent, not as a  fiscal principal, that is, with a full joint and several guarantee for all 
SMP purchases from the euro area governments. His successor should insist on releasing 
the details of how counterparties were chosen and the prices that the ECB paid.
                                               
10 Recent public disagreements within the Executive Board may get it used to the idea that it need not speak as 
one.
